Ciclos de protesta y referéndums por la independencia. Oportunidades cerradas y el camino de la radicalización en Cataluña by Della Porta, Donatella et al.
PROTEST CYCLES AND 
REFERENDUMS FOR 
INDEPENDENCE. CLOSED 
OPPORTUNITIES AND THE PATH 
OF RADICALIZATION IN CATALONIA
CICLOS DE PROTESTA Y 
REFERÉNDUMS POR LA 
INDEPENDENCIA. OPORTUNIDADES 
CERRADAS Y EL CAMINO DE LA 
RADICALIZACIÓN EN CATALUÑA
Donatella Della Porta
Scuola Normale Superiore (Florence, Italy)
donatella.dellaporta@sns.it
ORCID iD: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5239-8773
Francis O’Connor
Peace Research Institute (Frankfurt, Germany)
oconnor@hsfk.de
ORCID iD: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6891-770X
Martín Portos
Scuola Normale Superiore (Florence, Italy)
martin.portos@sns.it
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1714-6383
Revista Internacional de Sociología  RIS
vol. 77 (4), e142, octubre-diciembre, 2019, ISSN-L:0034-9712
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.005
Cómo citar este artículo / Citation: Della Porta, D., F. 
O’Connor and M. Portos. 2019. “Protest cycles and referen-
dums for independence. Closed opportunities and the path of 
radicalization in Catalonia”. Revista Internacional de Sociología 
77(4):e142. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.005
Copyright: © 2019 CSIC. This is an open-access article 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.
Abstract
This article seeks to understand the trajectory of radicalization 
in the Catalan ‘procés’. Regardless of their formal legal 
standing, referendum campaigns are distinct political 
opportunities which also generate further opportunities. 
Contrary to what some theories of protest would predict, 
when political opportunities are closed down at national 
level, and repression toughens, violent escalation leading 
to fragmentation and ultimately demobilization does not 
necessarily ensue, at least in the short term. As the Catalan 
‘procés’ illustrates between the mid-2000s and late-2018, 
the combination of mechanisms such as appropriation 
of opportunities, downward scale shift and movement 
convergence can mitigate escalation processes. A dense 
network of local and grassroots assemblies displaced the 
previously dominant, major civil society organizations that 
led mass protests, especially during the 2012-2015 ‘diadas’. 
These grassroots actors prioritized the organization of 
dissent through more direct, more disruptive, but mostly 
peaceful forms of action. This in turn facilitated movement 
convergence, based upon solidarization, as it opened up local 
spaces where the activists from across the spectrum could 
mobilize together, pre-empting a clear violent escalation and 
the emergence of violent splinter groups till late 2018.
Keywords
Policing of protest; Secessionism; Referendums; Downward 
scale shift; Movement convergence. 
Resumen
En este artículo desarrollamos un marco interpretativo para 
comprender la trayectoria de radicalización en el “procés” ca-
talán. Independientemente del estatus legal del referéndum 
en cuestión, las campañas de referéndum son capaces de 
crear, y de hecho son en sí mismas, oportunidades políticas. 
En contraste con las predicciones desde las teorías de los 
ciclos de protesta, cuando se cierran las oportunidades a ni-
vel nacional y la represión se intensifica, no necesariamente 
se desarrolla un proceso de radicalización que contribuye al 
declive del ciclo, al menos a corto plazo. Como el caso catalán 
ilustra entre mediados de los años 2000 y finales de 2018, 
varios mecanismos pueden mediar este proceso, incluyendo 
la apropiación de oportunidades políticas, el cambio de escala 
hacia abajo y la convergencia del movimiento. Una densa red 
de asambleas locales de base reemplaza en el a las gran-
des organizaciones de la sociedad civil que hasta entonces, 
y especialmente durante las diadas entre 2012 y 2015, ha-
bían liderado la movilización social. Aunque estas asambleas 
ciudadanas han abrazado repertorios de acción más direc-
tos y disruptivos, estos han sido mayoritariamente pacíficos. 
Asimismo, este reemplazo ha favorecido la convergencia del 
movimiento, abriendo espacios donde activistas de un amplio 
espectro pueden movilizarse conjuntamente, y evitando de 
este modo una escalada violenta y la emergencia de grupos 
escindidos violentos (al menos hasta finales de 2018).
Palabras Clave
Vigilancia de protestas; Secesionismo; Referéndums; Cambio 
descendente de escala; Convergencia de movimientos.
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1. Introduction
Although the waves of new states emergent af-
ter World War I, the de-colonization period and the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union, have declined in in-
tensity (Haklai 2015, 462), a steady trickle of non-
state nations continue to assert demands for col-
lective self-determination in vastly differing political 
contexts, from Scotland and Catalonia to New Cale-
donia and Bougainville (della Porta, O’Connor and 
Portos 2019). Referendums have been increasingly 
used to put forward and validate such claims to self-
determination. Recent research has demonstrated 
that referendums are not simply an elite-designed, 
technical procedure involving one single act of mass 
engagement on the day of the actual vote (della Por-
ta, O’Connor, Portos and Subirats 2017a). Rather, 
several referendums have been induced and/or ap-
propriated by social movements in many heterog-
enous contexts, beyond states with constitutionally 
enshrined rights for citizen-initiated referendums, like 
Italy, or states with deep rooted traditions of direct 
democracy such as Switzerland. 
Irrespective of their legal status (institutionally en-
dorsed, legally binding or symbolic), referendums 
have become epicentres of contestation in broader 
cycles of contention. Instead of mere devices that 
institutional actors use to retrospectively legitimize 
technocratic decisions, “referendums from below” 
build upon the participatory and grassroots process-
es that foster— and conversely, are fostered by— 
years of civil society mobilization that pre-date the ac-
tual vote (della Porta et al. 2017a, 2017b; della Porta 
et al. 2019). As instances of heightened contention, 
referendums from below can provoke repression by 
incumbent powerholders, triggering processes of 
radicalization, understood as escalation via an inter-
active process from nonviolent to increasingly violent 
repertoires of action over time (Bosi and Malthaner 
2015; della Porta 2018; Malthaner 2018). Violent 
tactics— defined as physical damage to people and 
property— are more likely to be deployed by actors 
in cases where claims for self-determination are 
blocked by the prohibition of institutionally binding 
referendums. Catalonia presents some of the con-
ditions often considered as propitious for a violent 
escalation. With the crucial support of regional and 
local-level institutional allies, a prolonged cycle of 
contention beginning in the early 2000s, developed 
into a mass movement. During the process, claims 
escalated towards increasing support for indepen-
dence; and as political opportunities at the national 
level closed down, repression and political polariza-
tion intensified. While there was an increase in the 
use of collective direct-action initiatives and disrup-
tive forms of protest (such as streets blockades), 
protest has remained mostly peaceful. Even in the 
face of harsh repression and institutional closure, 
in this article we argue that the pro-independence 
movement’s surprisingly constrained repertoire with 
limited violence— at least until late 2018— can be 
explained by three mechanisms: the appropriation of 
local opportunities, the downward scale shift of mobi-
lization and movement convergence as produced by 
solidarization processes. 
We develop our argument by looking at the tra-
jectory of radicalization during the Catalan procés. 
Empirical data from semi-structured interviews and 
descriptive statistics will be used throughout for il-
lustrative purposes.1 First we summarize the liter-
ature on cycles of contention in social movement 
studies, singling out expectations about the radical-
ization of forms of action. The article proceeds to 
provide a contextual background of the case, ad-
dressing the onset and consolidation of the cycle of 
protest for independence in Catalonia, and outlining 
the limited violent escalation throughout the cycle of 
contention. In the subsequent section, we introduce 
and illustrate how the identified mechanisms inter-
play and have contributed to the patterns of radical-
ization observed in Catalonia. 
2. Radicalization and cycles of 
protest
Social movement studies have suggested that 
forms of protest tend to change during periods of 
intense contention, as protest events cluster in time 
and space; cycle, waves, campaigns and tides are 
concepts developed in order to define “a punctu-
ated history of heightened challenges and relative 
stability” (Beissinger 2002, 16). Protest includes 
non-routinized, unconventional ways of affecting 
political, social, and cultural processes. They can 
be more or less radical in nature, ranging from more 
conventional petitioning to more conflictual block-
ades, and potentially, episodes of violence (della 
Porta 2018). A protest cycle is characterized as “a 
phase of heightened conflict and contention across 
the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of 
collective action from more mobilised to less mo-
bilised sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in 
the forms of contention; new or transformed col-
lective action frames; a combination of organized 
and unorganised participation; and sequences of 
intensified inter-actions between challengers and 
authorities which can end in reform, repression and 
sometimes revolution” (Tarrow 1994, 153). Cycles 
have been assumed to develop through some spe-
cific sequences in their rise, peak and decline as 
mobilization unfolds “from institutional conflict to en-
thusiastic peak to ultimate collapse” (Tarrow 1994, 
168), following relational, cognitive and emotional 
mechanisms that concatenate in different ways. 
Typically, upon the emergence of protest, the rep-
ertoire of action is innovative, with disruptive tactics 
often promoted by new social and political actors to 
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surprise the authorities and attract media attention. 
These tactics are often later emulated by other social 
groups that subsequently become mobilized. As the 
forms of protest evolve, and their disruptive capac-
ity normally declines, processes of institutionaliza-
tion and radicalization tend to co-occur (Tarrow 1994; 
della Porta 2013). At the outset of protest, violent ac-
tion is usually limited in its presence, small in scope, 
and unplanned (often the unforeseen result of police 
intervention during protests). As the protest spreads, 
spin-off movements contribute to the mobilization of 
other groups, adopting new forms of action, broaden-
ing protest demands and winning concessions, but 
they also push elites and counter-movements to form 
law-and-order coalitions (della Porta 1995, 2013). 
Moreover, as the newsworthiness of protest tends 
to decline over time, and as the mass media tend 
to refocus its attention elsewhere, radical actions 
succeed in re-gaining attention, but at the price of 
broader stigmatization. Clashes between demonstra-
tors and police or counter-demonstrators that start 
out as occasional episodes tend to take on a ritual 
quality. Their very presence increasingly discourages 
the more moderate (individual and collective) actors 
that often abandon the mobilization, subsequently 
contributing to demobilization. 
Repression has an important role in these trajec-
tories of radicalization of action repertoires. As the 
cycle unfolds, authorities tend to increase repres-
sion, but also to learn how to better target it against 
emerging actors. First, the authorities tend to channel 
the protest through the selective repression of some 
actors and some specific forms of protest, with the 
parallel acceptance of others. Repressive events that 
are perceived as unjust have the potential to gener-
ate public outrage, thus potentially leading to greater 
movement mobilization (Hess and Martin 2006). Au-
thorities often aim at dividing the movement, through 
a mix of co-optation and exclusion (Tarrow 1994; 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). As formal orga-
nizations emerge out of the protest and previously 
existing ones (such as unions or parties) become 
displaced, a form of intra-movement competitive 
re-positioning ensues. The final stages of the cycle 
thus see both processes of institutionalization and 
of radicalization, as indicated by a growing percent-
age of violent actions. When institutional alternatives 
open up, divisions among movement strands follow, 
leading to demobilization (Tarrow 1994; della Porta 
1995; della Porta and Diani 2006). While the most 
rebellious movement milieus stick to unconventional 
tactics, usually radicalizing their repertoires of action, 
the most moderate sectors tend to embrace more in-
stitutionalized routes of action (Portos 2019). 
Radicalization has been considered as the most 
likely outcome of the closing down of political op-
portunities and the adoption of strong and indiscrimi-
nate repression (Crenshaw 1981; della Porta 1995; 
Piazza 2017). However, radicalization in a violent 
form is not an inevitable consequence of cyclical dy-
namics, as the spread of violence during the cycles 
of protest varies in time and space. Cycles of protests 
during the formation of the nation-state led to a reper-
toire of centralized political activity and social move-
ments organized at the national level (Tilly 1978). 
More recently, challenges to the state have led to the 
development of multi-level social movement organi-
zations in frequent interaction with international orga-
nizations (della Porta and Tarrow 2004). In particular, 
radicalization is influenced both by political opportu-
nities and by relational dynamics, rather than being 
determined by either structural constraints or fixed 
patterns of evolution (della Porta 1995, 2018).
Building upon this model, we introduce three cave-
ats to extant literature that will help us to frame our 
case study as a case of repression with constrained 
violent escalation of repertoires of protest. First, we 
point out the need to distinguish between behavioural 
and ideational forms of radicalization, or radicaliza-
tion of forms of protest versus radicalization of frames 
of protest— alternatively described as the difference 
between tactical and ideological radicalization (Bush-
er, Holbrook and Macklin 2018). Social movement 
studies have predominantly defined radicalization as 
the progressive shift toward acceptance and use of 
violence as a means to achieve political goals (see 
e.g. della Porta and LaFree 2012; Alimi, Demetriou 
and Bosi 2015; McCauley and Moskalenko 2017; 
Lindekilde, Malthaner and O’Connor 2018). The radi-
calization of the definition of political objectives, rath-
er than just the means of achieving them is also rel-
evant, considering “the expansion of collective action 
frames to more extreme agendas and the adoption of 
more transgressive forms of contention” (McAdam et 
al. 2001: 69). Addressing the question of ‘radical rela-
tive to what?’ (Sedgwick 2010, 482), we will not draw 
on some amorphous “status quo” or ill defined “mod-
erate mainstream beliefs” (Bartlett and Miller 2012, 
2), but rather relate our understanding of radical to 
the existing repertoire of contention employed by 
the broader Catalan independence movement. More 
specifically, by radicalization of frames, we mean the 
adoption of independence rather than enhanced au-
tonomy as an objective; by radicalization of forms of 
protest we consider increasing degrees of disruptive-
ness such as the blocking of motorways, rather than 
the symbolic performances of the diadas (National 
Day of Catalonia). Importantly, the radicalization of 
the forms of protest, which is our focus throughout, is 
understood in a relational fashion. It is derived from 
a spiral of negative and unforeseen feedback that is 
rooted in the interactions between relevant actors 
such as challengers and authorities (della Porta and 
Diani 2006; Alimi et al. 2015; della Porta 2018).
A second caveat is related to the “eventful” charac-
ter of protest. Historical sociologist William H. Sewell 
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has promoted an “eventful temporality [that] recog-
nizes the power of events in history” (1996, 262). 
The events have a transformative effect, in that they 
“transform structures largely by constituting and em-
powering new groups of actors or by re-empowering 
existing groups in new ways” (Sewell 1996, 271; Mc-
Adam and Sewell 2001). A transformative event—or 
campaign— refers to ‘‘a crucial turning point for a 
social movement that dramatically increases or de-
creases the level of mobilization’’ (Hess and Martin 
2006, 249; see also McAdam and Sewell 2001). This 
implies that protest events must not be regarded 
merely as an explanandum. According to Meyer and 
Kimeldorf (2015, 429), events “are also social mecha-
nisms of their own with the capacity to initiate change 
across multiple registers and levels of explanation”. 
In this sense, the protest events which comprise cy-
cles are not considered as determined by their con-
text, but rather as constituting arenas in which col-
lective experiences develop through the interactions 
of different individual and collective actors, replete 
with different roles and objectives. In other words, 
events can become the explanans. Many protest 
events have in fact cognitive, affective and relational 
impacts on the very movements that carry them out 
(della Porta 2008). During protest events, new tactics 
are experimented with, signals about the possibility 
of collective action are sent, feelings of solidarity are 
created, organizational networks are consolidated, 
and sometimes public outrage at repression is gen-
erated. Events initially constrained by the external, 
structural conditions, help, therefore, in redefining the 
conditions for a successive chain of events. Hence, 
the eventful character of specific protest events (or 
sets of events) such as the 1st October 2017 referen-
dum, can become key turning points within a cycle, 
thereby shaping the whole radicalization process.
A third caveat addresses the complex interaction 
of multilevel political opportunities. Sidney Tarrow has 
authoritatively defined political opportunities as “con-
sistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – 
dimensions of the political environment or of change 
in that environment that provide incentives for col-
lective action by affecting expectations for success 
or failure” (1994, 85). Varying across different levels 
from the local to the transnational (Meyer 2003), op-
portunities are all interlinked in intended and unin-
tended fashions as “changes in the municipal level 
can bring about changes at the state level and, in 
turn, at the international level. This interplay can lead 
to outcomes that can go any number of ways” (Alimi 
2009, 227). In parallel to institutional closure at the 
state level, windows of opportunity can emerge with 
institutional allies at the local and regional levels.
In sum, multiple cases have demonstrated that 
repression, or the transformation of opportunities to 
threats can lead to a radicalization of movements’ 
repertoires (Almeida 2003, 2018). Yet, this has oc-
curred only to a limited extent in the Catalan case 
till late 2018. We argue that this puzzling instance 
of constrained escalation is a result of mechanisms 
that concatenate after certain eventful protests: ap-
propriation of local opportunities, downward scale 
shift and movement convergence. On the one hand, 
conflict scaled down and new grassroots and local 
actors that emerged were able to appropriate open-
ing political opportunities and lead the organization 
of dissent, also including many youth-led initiatives. 
On the other hand, consistent with the broadening 
constituency, as well as with democratic-emancipa-
tory frames developed throughout the cycle, different 
secessionist milieus converged for strategic reasons 
following certain mass protest events, notwithstand-
ing profound ideological internal tensions.
3. Protest and policing in the Cata-
lan pro-independence procés
The cycle of protest that developed around the 
process is embedded in, but has also transformed 
the tradition of Catalanism. While the Esquerra 
Republican de Catalunya (ERC) remained initially 
weak after the transition to democracy, the post-
Franco history of Catalan politics has long been 
shaped by the nationalist project of Jordi Pujol, 
leader of CiU (Convergència i Unió) since the first 
democratic election in 1980 until the mid-2000s. A 
centre-right and moderate nationalist coalition made 
up of centrist-liberals and demo-Christian style con-
servatives, it sought to increase Catalan autonomy 
within the extant constitutional framework of the 
Spanish state. The increasing salience of Catalan 
nationalism has led to a re-configuration of tradition-
al left-right cleavage through demands for enhanced 
territorial autonomy and even independence (Dinas 
2012). While traditionally the Catalan nationalist left 
was a stronger proponent of independence, recent 
years have seen Catalan centre-right nationalist mi-
lieus abandon their ambiguous positions of the past 
to also campaign for independence. 
The process of reform of the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy, from 2003 to 2010, is “widely regarded 
as providing a favourable context for a public discus-
sion of Catalonia’s relationship to Spain and for the 
Catalan secessionist movement to gain momentum” 
(Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013, 49). The Catalan cycle 
of protests for more autonomy and then indepen-
dence from Spain started with the opening up of op-
portunities for strengthened autonomy brought about 
by the concurrence in power at regional and state 
levels of the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya 
(PSC) (2003-2010) in the Catalan government, and 
of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in 
the Spanish government from 2004 to 2011. The fra-
ternal relations between the two parties and the pre-
vailing prosperous economic conditions facilitated 
the opening of opportunities for the re-negotiation of 
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Catalonia’s institutional relationship with the central 
Spanish government. Catalan discontent increased, 
however, as the proposed reform of the Statute of 
Autonomy (Catalonia’s Basic Law), approved by the 
Catalan parliament and in a Catalan wide referen-
dum in 2006, was strongly opposed by the Partido 
Popular, then in opposition, and some of its key 
content was ultimately ruled unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court in 2010. The conflict between 
centre and periphery subsequently spiralled as the 
Great Recession hit Spain, resulting in a compli-
cated multi-level economic, social, political and ter-
ritorial crisis that developed during this period. The 
contestation around the territorial cleavage intensi-
fied under the economic distress of these years co-
incided and overlapped with mass mobilization and 
resistance to the anti-austerity policies implemented 
at Catalan and state levels. It is important to note 
that the 15M/ indignados in Barcelona were met with 
harsh repression by Catalan authorities.2 Likewise, 
the CiU-controlled regional government promoted a 
neo-liberal agenda as a response to economic dis-
tress that included severe cutbacks and welfare re-
trenchment (del Pino and Ramos 2018).
Between 2006 and 2010, the forthcoming deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court on the new statute 
of autonomy had begun to be framed by Catalanist 
actors as likely to result in a rejection, in whole or 
in substantial part (Basta 2017). This was seen by 
many of those who desired greater powers and en-
hanced recognition for Catalonia as confirming the 
impossibility of a negotiated solution, thus necessi-
tating a change of approach away from institutional 
strategies to a more broad-based mobilization. In 
June 2010, the Constitutional Court declared sev-
eral provisions with reference to Catalonia’s status 
as a nation and its language policies, as well as to a 
range of economic and political competencies, null 
and void. This resulted in a major boost in support 
for independence, which had been theretofore rather 
marginal in Catalonia in terms of parliamentary sup-
port and public preferences (Basta 2017). As Figure 
1 shows, support for an independent Catalan state 
slowly increased from 13.6 per cent in June 2005 
to 19.4 per cent in February 2010, before jumping 
to 48.5 per cent by November 2013. In a striking 
development in the history of the Catalan nationalist 
movement, many Catalans abandoned simple ad-
vocacy for the nation’s linguistic and cultural iden-
tity and for further institutional autonomy. Instead, 
many Catalans embraced outright independence, 
challenging Spain’s constitutional arrangement in 
place since 1978, with its deliberately ambivalent 
compromise on regional autonomy and symmetric 
devolution (Guibernau 2013).
Given the seemingly insurmountable legal 
and political obstacles precluding any possibil-
ity of substantially altering Catalonia’s relationship 
with Spain, the cycle of contention swung toward 
grassroots movement actors, with increasing pres-
sure from the streets in the form of mass protest 
(della Porta et al. 2017a). In fact, the cycle of pro-
test was characterized by a considerable capacity 
Figure 1.
Preferred status for Catalonia in relation to Spain. X-axis: date (barometer released). Y-axis: percentage of respondents
Data source: Baròmetre d’Opinió Política (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, Generalitat de Catalunya). Own elaboration.
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political will to hold a referendum in the near fu-
ture, exacerbating the conflict between Catalan and 
Spanish institutions (Orriols and Rodón 2016).
In the 2015 Catalan election, the main pro-inde-
pendence civil society organizations and parties 
(ERC, CiU) ran together in a joint electoral platform, 
Junts pel Sí (“Together for the yes”).3 The govern-
ing pro-independence coalition coalesced around 
the promise to hold a binding referendum on in-
dependence, committing to an eventual unilateral 
declaration of independence, providing it obtained 
more than 50% of the votes (della Porta et al. 
2017b) — notwithstanding the pro-independence 
majority in the regional Parliament in terms of 
seats, secessionist parties never won a majority of 
Catalan votes. Although Spanish authorities largely 
tolerated the 2014 non-binding symbolic vote, the 
organizers of the 2017 referendum were targeted 
with harsh policing at various protest events and 
the juridical action that led to the arrest of several 
Catalan pro-independence politicians and promi-
nent pro-independence figures. According to della 
Porta et al. (2017b),
“Events in the weeks preceding the [1st October 2017] 
referendum, however, triggered renewed grassroots 
mobilisation. On September 20th, Spanish Guardia 
Civil officers raided several offices of the Catalan re-
gional government, arrested 14 senior officials, and 
confiscated 9.6 million referendum ballot papers as 
part of an operation to prevent the referendum from 
taking place. Spanish authorities also threatened ju-
dicial measures against the organisers of the refer-
endum, blocked websites, froze regional financial as-
sets, limited credit and imposed central supervision 
over payments for non-essential services by the Gen-
eralitat and other public institutions… thousands 
flocked onto the streets of Barcelona blocking major 
roads in the city chanting the slogans “no tinc por” (I 
am not afraid) and “fora les forces d’ocupació” (occu-
pation forces out). In the wake of the hard-line actions 
taken by the Spanish authorities which prevented the 
Catalan government from logistically preparing for 
the vote, the organisational burden was taken up or-
dinary citizens. People were organised through local 
‘Comitès de Defensa del Referendum’ (Referendum 
Defence Committees) that coordinated through Twit-
ter, WhatsApp and Telegram”.
On 1st October 2017, 2.2 million Catalans turned 
out to vote, defying the heavy repression by state 
security forces who resorted to firing rubber bul-
lets and the seizure of ballot boxes and closure of 
polling stations. Mass actions of civil disobedience 
ensured that the Spanish national police were only 
able to shut down 319 out of a total of 2,315 polling 
stations4. Civil society organizations and individual 
citizens hid ballot boxes, occupied polling stations 
in order to prevent the police seizing them, repli-
cated the website created to organize the referen-
dum (www.referendum.cat) under new domains, as 
soon as it was removed, and erected barricades on 
for innovation of the protest repertoire, as well as 
a broadening of the social bases of mobilization 
(della Porta and Portos 2018). From 2012 to 2015, 
diadas launched by civil society organizations such 
as Òmnium Cultural and Assemblea Nacional Cat-
alana became major occasions to voice national 
grievances. On 11th September 2012, roughly one 
in five Catalans gathered to voice their collective 
desire for secession in the largest (at the time) pro-
independence march in democratic Spain. Exactly 
one year later, following the ancient Via Augusta 
from Le Perthus (France) to Vinaroz (Castellón), 
civil society organizations gathered 1.6 million peo-
ple— many of them wearing t-shirts with the logo 
‘My place in history. Catalan Via towards Indepen-
dence’— who joined together along the 400-kilome-
tre Catalan coastline in what was reputed to be the 
largest human chain ever assembled. Under the 
slogan ‘Now is the time, united for the new coun-
try’, in September 2014 about two million protest-
ers filled the streets of Barcelona in alternate co-
lourful rows resembling the Senyera (Catalan flag). 
Apart from these large-scale events, civil society’s 
contribution to pro-independence activism also in-
cluded international publicity campaigns, cultural 
performances, and local dissemination activities 
(Crameri 2015, 104-5). Preceded by more than 
500 municipal-level non-binding consultations on 
independence that took place from 2009 to 2011 
(Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013), on 9th November 2014 
about 2.3 million people cast their votes in a mas-
sive symbolic and non-binding voting performance 
led by extra-parliamentary actors and movements, 
with the collaboration of the Catalan parliament 
(della Porta et al. 2017a, 39).
As national opportunities closed, new oppor-
tunities were forged at regional level. In fact, the 
increase in support for, and mobilization around 
independence coincides with the subsequent re-
positioning of the traditionally moderate Catalan 
nationalist forces (Rico and Liñeira 2014). Impor-
tantly, CiU abandoned its once pragmatic national-
ist positions and embraced more openly pro-inde-
pendence stances. The 2012 election ‘produced a 
[Catalan] parliament heavily polarized on the terri-
torial question, with traditionally minor parties gain-
ing ground over mainstream formations’ (Rico and 
Liñeira 2014, 257-8). Despite a relatively disap-
pointing electoral showing, CiU managed to remain 
in power through a minority government externally 
supported by the other pro-independence parties, 
dependent on CiU sticking to its promise to hold a 
referendum on independence against the firm op-
position of the main state-wide parties (Rico and 
Liñeira 2014). In January 2013, the Catalan parlia-
ment adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty, which 
asserted Catalonia as a sovereign political subject. 
Although declared unconstitutional by the Constitu-
tional Court, this highly symbolic act signalled the 
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the day of the vote in order to facilitate voting and 
block police access (della Porta et al. 2017b). Ac-
cording to the— admittedly disputable—figures the 
Generalitat provided, 893 people required medical 
assistance as a consequence of the intervention of 
the Spanish police as the latter attempted to enter 
the polling stations and confiscate the ballot box-
es5. The policing of these events raised concerns 
among human rights organizations; for instance 
Human Rights Watch claimed that “Spanish police 
used excessive force in Catalan referendum”.6 Al-
though the Spanish authorities intervened to inhibit 
the holding of a democratically credible vote, thus 
denying a key opportunity for the pro-independence 
forces to claim a full victory, the eventful charac-
ter and grassroots efforts to protect the referendum 
generated opportunities at the local level, by mo-
bilising thousands of activists to facilitate the vote. 
A toughening of protest policing in Spain had al-
ready been noted in state reaction to anti-austerity 
mobilization, with authorities deploying a mix of 
coercive forms of street repression that gradually 
evolved towards softer and more subtle tactics, 
e.g. fines, identity checks, and surveillance activi-
ties (Calvo and Portos 2018; Martín García 2014). 
During most of the cycle of protest in Catalonia, 
the policing strategy of the central government 
against the procés actors has combined some at-
tempts at the de-escalation of street-based activi-
ties, with legalism. While the Spanish authorities 
presented the increasing support for a referendum 
and independence as a defiance of the rule of law, 
they dramatically underestimated the scale of the 
mobilization and the re-intensification of the territo-
rial cleavage (della Porta et al. 2017a, 39-68). At 
the political level, rather than articulating a politi-
cal discourse that sought compromise around self-
determination, central state institutions opted for 
a policy of intimidation by threatening prominent 
individuals with legal prosecution (della Porta et 
al. 2017a, 60-1). While positions polarized (among 
both civil society and political elites), the conflict 
escalated. As the policing strategies toughened, 
endogenously fostering grievances among— and 
beyond— the pro-independence milieus, tensions 
and clashes between activists and police seem to 
have increased in Catalonia, not only in the weeks 
preceding and during the referendum, but also 
thereafter.7 This repressive turn strengthened the 
resonance of the democratic-emancipatory frames 
the Catalanist actors had been developing in pre-
ceding years (della Porta et al. 2017a). The cycle 
brought about a considerable degree of radicaliza-
tion and polarization of claims, frames and justifi-
cations for independence (and anti-secessionism), 
but a very limited amount of actual violent forms of 
action deployed by the challengers (at least until 
late 2018), which mainly came in the form of inter-
mittent clashes with police.
4. Appropriation of local oppor-
tunities, downward scale shift 
and movement convergence as 
mechanisms of constrained radi-
calization
In order to explain the path of radicalization of 
frames but very limited behavioural violence by the 
pro-independence challenges during the Catalan 
procés, we firstly need to take the changing multi-lev-
el political opportunity structures into consideration 
(McAdam and Tarrow 2018). Political opportunity ex-
planations have considered elections and balances 
of parliamentary power as opportunities (Jung 2010, 
28; Meyer 2003). However, the issue of scale shift 
(with changing balances of political opportunities 
across different institutional levels) has been argu-
ably neglected in theorizations on the effect of politi-
cal opportunities on protests. In the Catalan case, the 
opening up of opportunities at both the regional and 
local levels triggered the original process of consti-
tutional change that sought to increase the power of 
the regional institutions. In order to remain in power, 
Junts pel Sí’s parliamentary coalition needed the 
support of the radically independentist CUP, there-
fore the CiU could not slip back to its previously more 
pragmatic approach to independence. Notwithstand-
ing that referendums are a major form of democratic 
expression in liberal democracies, second only to 
elections, the literature has, to date, focused much 
less on their role in creating political opportunities, 
or as opportunities in their own right. Although, refer-
endums that do not have institutional or juridical ap-
proval have been dismissed as “at best a statement 
of protest” (Sussman in Scheindlin 2012, 67), the 
campaign for the Dret a Decidir, a call for the right to 
democratic self-determination, resonated with grow-
ing discontent among the Catalan citizenry regarding 
the slow pace and uncertain destiny of the process. 
While it is unlikely that those who voted in the mu-
nicipal consultations of 2009-2011, in the non-bind-
ing voting performance in 2014, and in the prohibited 
2017 referendum, had believed that their votes would 
bring about a straightforward implementation of inde-
pendence, the holding of a referendum on self-de-
termination can in itself endogenously contribute to 
identity consolidation (Tierney 2009, 362). A consoli-
dated identity enhances movement cohesion, draws 
in broader demographics of supporters (e.g. young 
first-time voters) and subsequently strengthens the 
movement, allowing it to better resist the repressive 
actions of the central state, engineer new political op-
portunities and fuel mobilization.
In short, with the conservative Partido Popolar (PP) 
winning national elections in 2011, opportunities for a 
negotiated enhanced autonomy (not necessarily full 
independence) for Catalonia closed down at national 
level. Some important precursors notwithstanding, 
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at this point civil society organizations strengthened 
and were able to lead the mobilization of mass dis-
sent, most visibly in the form of mass protest and per-
formances during celebrations of Catalonia’s national 
day. Importantly, secessionist movements found al-
lies al the regional level in the Catalan Parliament, 
which increasingly adopted more radical frames to-
wards the territorial issue, before eventually embrac-
ing outright independence. As the cycle unfolded, 
polarization increased and repression on the side of 
central state actors toughened, as illustrated by the 
use of force during the 1st October 2017 referendum. 
Conversely, opportunities for mobilization gradually 
opened up at the regional and also at the local and 
grassroots levels, which some pro-independence mi-
lieus were able to appropriate and use to consolidate 
support and pro-independence activism.
Grassroots pro-independence mobilization has 
existed at least since the creation of the Plataforma 
pel Dret de Decidir – PDD (“Platform for the Right to 
Decide”) and the organization of local consultations 
on independence (2006-2011). With the support of 
institutional and semi-institutional actors (e.g. Asso-
ciation of Municipalities for Independence, pro-inde-
pendence parties, unions, etc.), two major civil so-
ciety organizations— Assemblea Nacional Catalana 
(ANC) and Òmnium Cultural (OC)— were central to 
secessionist mobilizations in Catalonia from 2011 to 
summer 2017. As the cycle of contention unfolded, 
new actors emerged and took over the leading role 
of mobilization. There was a shift of scale down-
wards in the organization of pro-independence con-
testation, especially during and after the referendum 
campaign of 1st October 2017. Decentralising dis-
sent beyond the major organizations, grassroots 
Comitès de Defensa de la Repùblica (CDRs)8 or-
ganized at the neighbourhood-level in order to em-
power people and promote left-wing independen-
tism. In a way, the CDRs are the consequence of 
the unique way in which the mobilization unfolded. 
The following quote from an interview with an activ-
ist illustrates the main features and aims of CDRs as 
linked to rooting at the very local scale:
“CDRs are born in an autonomous way, to organize 
neighbours, they are born to cover this need... in a 
way, they are the natural evolution of large organi-
zations such as ANC and Òmnium. These organiza-
tions became mass endeavours but do a very super-
ficial activism… it has been very much criticized as 
activism-for-the-picture: I organize a massive dem-
onstration, with millions of people, I take a wonderful 
picture, but it has zero impact, then they do very little 
work at the local level. It doesn’t create a fabric and 
works in a very hierarchical way. … CDRs instead 
come from the local people who feel they need to get 
organized in order to have the referendum” (Int.2).
Similarly to the 1965–1975 Italian cycle of protest, 
the secessionist wave of contention rose “like a roll-
ing tide that engulfed different sectors of society at 
different times’’ (Tarrow 1989, 339). As mobilizations 
unfolded across sectors, the bases of social conflict 
shifted and broadened (della Porta and Portos 2018). 
Not only did dissent spread across layers of society, 
but contention diffused to different levels of the pol-
ity, with new institutional settings and additional actors 
coming into play, ranging from Catalonia’s ruling politi-
cal parties to neighbourhood assemblies. Scale shift 
is a mechanism associated with diffusion processes, 
referring to the ‘‘change in the number and level of 
coordinated contentious actions leading to broader 
contention involving a wider range of actors and bridg-
ing their claims and identities’’ (McAdam et al. 2001, 
331; Tarrow 1989, 1994). Normally, scale shift in politi-
cal contention has been studied upwards, from local 
to translocal (even transnational) spheres. As a poly-
cephalous, decentralized network of actors gradually 
integrates and coordinates, it brings about changes in 
the actors and their interactions (della Porta and Tar-
row 2004). In contrast to this, downward scale shift 
occurs when coordinated contentious activities move 
their focus downwards— e.g. as in Catalonia, with the 
local level taking up national issues. The scale shift 
downwards and the emergence of grassroots local-
level endeavours are key to explaining the trajectory 
or repertoires of collective action within the cycles of 
protest. They facilitated, to some extent, the kind of 
tactics advocated by some of the more militant move-
ment strands (i.e. more direct, disruptive actions), but 
nevertheless, precluded escalation into more substan-
tial forms of oppositional violence such as strategic 
attacks on police or state functionaries or even vio-
lence targeting infrastructure. Despite some scattered 
incidents of brawls and intimidation, we argue that no 
substantial radicalization in terms of the endorsement 
or use of violent tactics to achieve the goal of Catalan 
independence occurred until late 2018. 
Toughening repressive strategies— widely per-
ceived as disproportionate repression especially fol-
lowing the 1-O referendum— played an important role 
in strengthening the social legitimacy of the CDRs. 
By embracing more disruptive tactics, CDRs aimed 
to halt the circulation of traffic, block access to cit-
ies, motorways and to the French border. The CDRs 
were also key actors in the general strikes in Catalo-
nia on 3rd October 2017 against the repression which 
followed the 1-O events, and on the 8th November 
2017 against the implementation of Article 155 of the 
Spanish Constitution, which led to the suspension of 
Catalanonia’s autonomous powers. Some public in-
stitutions and companies gave workers the day off, 
enabling workers to participate in the strike without 
incurring any risks to their jobs, thus likely boosting 
participation. Blockades, occupations, and occasion-
al clashes with police took place during those days 
and recurred during the subsequent weeks as reac-
tions to the arrests and imprisonment of some mem-
bers of President Puigdemont’s government and the 
leaders of civil society organizations.9 As stated by an 
PROTEST CYCLES AND REFERENDUMS FOR INDEPENDENCE. CLOSED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE PATH OF RADICALIZATION IN CATALONIA . 9
RIS  [online] 2019, 77 (4), e142. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.005
activist in a CDRs, unexpected levels of repression 
fuelled further mobilization:
“The 1-O came as a collective shock. With all the bru-
tal repression people saw on TV, the way children 
and elderly people were forced out of the schools, 
beaten for exercising democratic rights, this was a 
reminder of the dictatorial times. On the basis of the 
repression, the organizers and citizens suffered the 
previous day, people could smell something was go-
ing on… Masses of people came to get information, 
to find out what was going on… right before 1-O we 
had neighbourhood assemblies with more than 400 
participants in this small neighbourhood. But prob-
ably nobody expected the level of repression we 
saw… after 1-O, people interested in our activities, 
supporting us, and engaging in the assemblies in-
creased exponentially” (Int.2).
As another CDR activist explained, because of the 
broad support of the mobilization, the collective reac-
tion to the perceived injustice of the central state’s 
measures could be channelled into nonviolent forms, 
from blockades to strikes:
“You block roads, you have a general strike, you 
do an occupation, and you have a higher impact… 
it is impressive to see a liberal from CiU blocking 
a road or a motorway, but they realize it is effec-
tive, they see the great job CDRs are doing, and 
see their [own] discourse often does not translate 
into coherent action… The president of the CEOE 
[Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] 
acknowledged that little has been said regarding the 
amount of hours and money lost during the Novem-
ber strikes…10 if we manage to keep spreading this 
type of activism, we can get to a situation where the 
Spanish government will be on the brink, where they 
will be forced to negotiate” (Int.3).
Although repertoires of action became more 
disruptive, there was no clear escalation toward 
violence (till late 2018). Yet, the radicalization in 
the framing of the objectives of the struggle was 
strengthened by further repression and spiralling 
processes of solidarization with the victims of repres-
sion, including the injured and the imprisoned activ-
ists. CDR activists increasingly became the target of 
police repression. For instance, 150 activists held a 
protest in Barcelona’s Palace of Justice on 23rd Feb-
ruary 2018, which led to 14 people being arrested 
and prosecuted under charges of resistance towards 
authority and public disorder (and two of them for al-
leged attacks on public authority).11 
An additional mechanism constrained substan-
tial radicalization of repertoires, the convergence 
of pro-independence milieus through solidarization 
triggered by repression. Through ‘the radical flank 
effect’, increasing tensions at one or both extremes 
of a political continuum drive less extreme political 
actors into closer alliances (McAdam et al. 2001, 
162). In the case of the Catalan procés, increasing 
institutional polarization and toughening repressive 
strategies on the side of Spanish authorities fuelled 
emotions related to grievances and solidarity, bring-
ing pro-independence milieus together for strategic 
reasons and thus disincentivising more radical or 
potentially violent forms of contention. Convergence 
through solidarization is facilitated by the broadening 
cross-cut social basis of secessionism but also by 
the strong emphasis on non-violence, inclusive iden-
tities and democratic-emancipatory frames for mobi-
lization during the procés (della Porta et al. 2017a). 
Additionally, various protest performances such as 
the 2012-15 Diada events activated the convergence 
mechanism, as these encompassing mass— admit-
tedly intermittent and occasional—contentious per-
formances implied sharing spaces with other actors. 
Importantly, the 1-O referendum campaign allowed 
Catalan secessionist activists to give priority to the 
fighting of specific, smaller battles and to set more 
easily attainable goals, such as preventing the police 
from entering polling stations, and actually succeed-
ing in holding the vote.
As the scale of contention decreased to disaggre-
gated local levels, the— actual and expected— re-
wards from involvement tended to be better defined. 
These collaborations were key to allow for the over-
coming of traditional dividing lines (e.g., ideological) 
among the secessionist milieus and converged in 
various mobilization endeavors, which maintained 
the intensity of mobilization high, broadening the 
constituency and spreading the movement’s ap-
peal. In the words of a feminist pro-independence 
activist and a member of a CDR assembly: “the de-
centralized organization of the 1-O through schools, 
and then through CDRs, marks a turning point… it 
appealed to many people who didn’t use to get in-
volved with either of these big organizations or with 
parties… it was more of a cross-cutting momentum. 
There was also a broadening of the ideological com-
position” (Int.1). In the perception of the activists, 
CDRs “are truly cross-cutting, people from very dif-
ferent ideologies, age, social background, etc., and 
very different when it comes to their traditional rela-
tionship with politics. They encompass people from 
CUP, but also from ERC, PDeCAT12, people without 
any particular affiliation, even anarchists” (Int.2). 
These excerpts help illustrate how the conver-
gence mechanism unfolded. As police strategies 
toughened, there was a need to build broad coali-
tions and engage in grassroots work to maintain 
the intensity of mobilization. In part due to previous 
interactions and instances of collaboration, such 
as the diadas, the CDRs became spaces for cross-
cutting mobilization and brought different gen-
erations and milieus together in local spaces. The 
1-O referendum can be conceived as an eventful 
performance, which was forcibly repressed by the 
state in what was regarded by a large proportion 
of the Catalan population as disproportionate and 
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illegitimate, thus favoring the convergence of differ-
ent actors. Interacting with the downward scaling 
of the conflict the movement was undergoing, and 
the latter’s ability to appropriate opening political 
opportunities at both the regional and local levels, 
the movement convergence mechanism was key to 
shaping the radicalization processes.
5. Concluding remarks
This article has made two substantial argu-
ments. Firstly, informed by the Catalan referendum 
campaigns in 2014 and 2017, we argued that ref-
erendums should not be viewed as merely a way 
to technically adjudicate on constitutional issues. 
Rather, regardless of their legal standing, referen-
dums create and are political opportunities in and 
of themselves. They influence subsequent phases 
of the cycle of contention, re-positioning multi-level 
mobilization and drawing in different cohorts of ac-
tivists and social groups. Secondly, this article has 
highlighted that during a protest cycle, even when 
political opportunities are closed at a national lev-
el, and repression increases, violent escalation is 
not inevitable. In our case, a combination of three 
mechanisms restrained escalation: the appropria-
tion of local opportunities, downward scale shift and 
movement convergence. Regarding the first one, 
while political opportunities closed at the Spanish 
state level, the pro-independence parties main-
tained power in Catalonia, providing channels of 
institutional access for movement actors. The sec-
ond mechanism channelled popular outrage derived 
from the moral shock of repression viewed as un-
warranted in its brutality into a dense array of mostly 
non-violent initiatives organized by local CDRs. Yet, 
some of these actions were sufficiently confronta-
tional to appease the tactical preferences of more 
militant actors. The mass base of the movements 
facilitated the resort to disruptive (but mostly peace-
ful) forms of direct action, including blockades and 
strikes, in order to challenge the state and consoli-
date internal solidarity. Repression in turn guaran-
teed solidarization processes with ensuing move-
ment convergence, as it opened up local spaces 
where activists from across the spectrum (from 
radical to moderate, from left to right) could mobi-
lize together, thus maintaining broad support and 
inhibiting the formation of potentially violent radical 
splinters, at least till late 2018. 
These three mechanisms were likely facilitated 
by some additional context specific factors in pre-
venting violent escalation. The first is the negative 
example of the armed campaign in the Basque 
country. The perceived failure of violence in Eus-
kadi to achieve independence and the high price 
paid in terms of deaths, social confrontation and po-
larization, prison sentences and ultimately political 
marginalization served as a cautionary tale for more 
militant elements of the secessionist milieu in Cata-
lonia. The second factor is the impact of historical 
legacies and processes of movement self-identifica-
tion. Many movements find it difficult to reconcile the 
use of violence as part of their collective self-identity 
(Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 245). Catalan nation-
alism remained overwhelmingly non-violent for gen-
erations, even when faced with harsh repression 
under Franco’s fascist regime (de la Calle 2015, 
62-109). Precursors of the PDD and the ANC, such 
as La Crida in the period immediate following the 
return to democracy were avowedly non-violent.13 In 
addition, many of the movement activists, particu-
larly in its leftist extra-institutional elements, have 
been socialized within the non-violent global justice 
movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
the more recent anti-austerity mobilizations (della 
Porta and Tarrow 2004; Portos 2019). Additionally, 
if the PSOE is returned to power, particularly if it 
relies on the support of the left-wing parties such as 
Podemos and other minority nationalist parties that 
tend to be more open to a ‘right to decide’, it may 
re-open a small window of opportunity to accommo-
date some claims, if not in terms of secession, po-
tentially for further devolution and possibly the right 
to self-determination. 
Our findings echo the views of McCauley and 
Moskalenko when they questioned the relationship 
between the radicalization of beliefs and behav-
iour (2017). In the Catalan case, there has been 
a notable radicalization of the goal of the broader 
Catalan movement, radical in the sense that its 
previous goals were enhanced autonomy and now 
it is outright independence. Yet, there has been 
no clear substantial radicalization of the repertoire 
of the movement until the end of 2018, meaning 
it has not included or endorsed the use of violent 
tactics as a means to achieve its objective of an in-
dependent Catalonia, notwithstanding the exacer-
bating presence of increased repression. Thereby 
confirming the complex and highly contextualized 
relationship between means and goals but quali-
fying some of the prognoses of the radicalization 
literature (i.e., institutional closure is expected to 
lead to violent radicalization). However, this is no 
guarantee that the immediate future will also re-
main characterized by restraint and the absence 
of interpersonal violence. 
The consolidation of far-right Spanish national-
ism bolstered by the recent electoral growth of the 
VOX party and the adoption of some of its policies 
and rhetoric by other right-wing actors such as the 
PP and Ciudadanos could exacerbate tensions and 
result in a reciprocal escalation of tactics. In fact, 
recent episodes of threats as well as physical and 
verbal aggression towards journalists of state chan-
nels covering pro-independence gatherings might 
call into question to what extent we are experienc-
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ing a proper delayed radicalization process on the 
side of independentist actors.14 Moreover, at the 
time of revising this article in October 2019, lengthy 
prison sentences for Catalan independentist poli-
ticians and activists led to massive protests that 
at times radicalized, including the building of bar-
ricades, rioting, stone throwing, property damage 
and physical clashes with the police that responded 
with increasingly repressive tactics. In the first days 
of the protests, across Catalonia there were 200 
arrests and almost 600 injuries, including several 
injured police man and at least four protesters risk 
losing their sight due to the police’s use of rubber 
bullets.15 It is unclear if this will prove to be a turn-
ing point, marking an enduring pattern of violent 
escalation leading into 2020 or merely a violent 
upsurge likely to fizzle out in the immediate future. 
Further research is needed to assess the contri-
bution of other broader contextual elements such 
as the aversion to armed violence following ETA’s 
failed campaign in Euskadi to explain the Catalan 
case, as well as to assess the robustness of the 
mechanisms that we have singled out in our analy-
sis vis-à-vis other potentially relevant factors such 
as media framing or movements/parties’ changing 
strategies and leaderships.
Notes
[1] Qualitative data was gathered in 14 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with Catalan pro-independence 
activists and key informants in three different rounds of 
fieldwork, late 2014, three years later in 2017 and then 
in 2019— this choice is consistent with the longitudinal 
approach developed throughout the article (materials 
from these interviews were used in previous academic 
outputs, e.g. della Porta et al. 2017a; della Porta et 
al. 2019). While a snowballing strategy was used to 
recruit interviewees, they were balanced by organiza-
tional membership, past record of activism, gender and 
cohorts, as described in the Appendix (see della Porta 
2014; della Porta et al. 2017a).
[2] See https://www.publico.es/espana/mossos-reprimen-
dureza-indignados-y.html
[3] Although the JxSì coalition secured 62 seats, it was not 
enough to win with an absolute majority. It needed the 
support of the pro-independence radical left-wing Can-
didatura d’Unitat Popular (“Popular Unity Candidacy”), 
which is formed by semi-autonomous decentralized as-
semblies and gained 10 seats in the Catalan chamber.
[4] See https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/10/01/catalun-
ya/1506820373_674242.html
[5] See https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/02/he-
chos/1506963876_226068.html
[6] See https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2017/10/12/espana-
la-policia-utilizo-la-fuerza-de-manera-excesiva-en-
cataluna. Similarly, Amnesty International observers 
“confirmed excessive and unnecessary use of force by 
police, including the beating of defenceless people and 
the use of rubber balls to subdue peaceful protesters” 
(https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/catalan-
referendum-dangerous-use-force-spanish-police-con-
firmed-amnesty).
[7] See e.g. https://www.elpais.com.uy/mundo/enfrenta-
mientos-espana-policia-votantes-hay-heridos.html; 
https://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2018/09/29/5bafd93
922601d0e1c8b4654.html; https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-independence-re-
ferendum-polls-open-vote-protests-barcelona-madrid-
police-guardia-civil-a7976341.html.
[8] First named Committees in Defence of the Referen-
dum— Comitès de Defensa del Referèndum—, and 
then the Committees in Defence of the Republic— 
Comitès de Defensa de la Repùblica.
[9] See https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/general-princi-
pales-Cercanias-carreteras-cortadas_0_705879454.
html
[10] See https://www.europapress.es/economia/laboral-00346/
noticia-rosell-ve-brutal-tremendo-cataluna-perdiera-octu-
bre-10-millones-horas-huelgas-20171128104615.html
[11] See https://directa.cat/catorze-detencions-per-una-ac-
cio-de-denuncia-de-la-repressio-al-palau-de-justicia-
de-barcelona/
[12] Founded in 2016, the PDeCAT (Partit Demòcrata 
Europeu Català) is considered the successor of the 
center-right nationalist Convergència Democràtica 
de Catalunya, which was part of the CiU coalition that 
dissolved in June 2015 amid internal tensions and 
corruption scandals.
[13] The only exception being the terrorist independentist 
organization Terra Lliure, which caused hundreds of 
attacks and five dead people (four of which were mem-
bers of the very Terra Lliure) between 1978 and 1991.
[14] See, e.g., https://elpais.com/ccaa/2019/10/01/catalun-
ya/1569961792_640543.html; https://www.elperiodico.
com/es/politica/20191007/consejo-europa-alerta-agre-
sion-periodista-manifestacion-independentista-7670803
[15] See https://www.lavanguardia.com/politi-
ca/20191020/471095242135/cataluna-disturbios-
detenidos-policia-heridos-barcelona.html
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